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Case No. 14464 
* * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the Marie Dorothy 
Wattis Trust, established by a trust agreement dated February 2, 
1938, sued Defendants, as successor trustees, for alleged breaches 
of trust resulting in losses to Plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, granted a 
judgment against the Defendants John and Dorothy Dussault in 
the sum of $143,526.03. It also granted a judgment against 
Donald Bowman in the sum of $11,318.91 with an appendage granting 
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Bowman total indemnity or contribution from the Defendants 
Dussault. 
Judgment was entered March 5, 1974, from which 
Defendants Dussault appealed, Case No. 13657. Defendant Bowman 
did not appeal. 
On May 20, 1975, this court reversed the judgment of 
the trial court. Two days following that decision of this court's 
reversing the trial court's decision, Bowman filed his motion 
in the trial court to vacate its judgment against him which 
motion was granted by the court's ordering the judgment vacated 
and granting a new trial to Donald Bowman. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court's 
decision vacating the judgment against Donald Bowman and granting 
him a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust suffered substantial 
losses when corporate stock values declined in the early 1970's. 
These losses were alleged to be the fault of the successor 
trustees, John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault, and Respondent 
Donald Bowman who had denied ever being a trustee. 
After a lengthy trial of the matter, a judgment 
was entered against the Defendants Dussault (who had done all 
of the investing of trust funds) in the sum of $143,526.03. 
Against Respondent Donald Bowman (who had never participated 
directly or indirectly in the investment of trust funds) a 
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judgment was entered in the sum of $11,318.91 appended to which 
was a right of contribution or indemnification from Defendants 
Dussault for the exact amount of the judgment against Bowman. 
(R-10,11) It was the clearly expressed intention of the court 
that Bowman was to be held completely harmless because he had 
acted in good faith (R-3) and, as the trial court stated in 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
This damage or loss is included in, and not 
separate from, the damage to the trust suffered 
by reason of the co-defendants John A. Dussault 
and Dorothy Dussault. (R-8) 
In other words, the total award to Plaintiffs/Appellants was to 
be only $143,526.03, specifically included in which was the 
Bowman liability of $11,318.91. 
Defendant Bowman did not appeal his judgment to the 
Supreme Court because he did not want to incur any additional 
expenses to the Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust. Also, he relied 
on the finding of the lower court that his judgment was but a 
part of the judgment against the Dussaults which if reversed 
would of necessity include a reversal of that portion of the 
judgment pertaining to him. If sustained, the appendage to 
the judgment against him would serve to hold him harmless. 
Consequently, he did not believe it necessary to incur any 
additional expense by appealing. 
On May 20, 1975, this court reversed the judgment 
of the trial court on the grounds the trust instrument pro-
vided that the trustees were to be under no personal liability 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
for security losses "...due to a falling stock market," 
Immediately following receipt of said decision, Donald Bowman 
caused a motion to be filed with the trial court to vacate 
the judgment against him. 
After receiving memoranda of authorities from all 
interested parties, the trial court vacated the $11,318.91 judg-
ment against Bowman and granted him a new trial. Referring to 
this court's decision (No. 13657), the trial court stated 
clearly its reason for vacating the judgment: 
The Court hereby grants Donald W. Bowman 
a new trial on the basis that the earlier 
judgment was based on the Court finding that 
Dussault had improperly caused losses. 
The case was tried on that basis and the 
Supreme Court has now ruled that Dussault1s 
conduct does not make the Trustee liable. (R-19) 
Plaintiffs/Appellants have appealed said order 
vacating the judgment and granting a new trial with allegations 
that the motion was untimely and that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to make such an order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO MAKE AND ENTER 
ITS ORDER OF JANUARY 6, 1976. 
Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. grants to a trial court broad 
discretionary power to vacate a judgment. It codifies long 
standing rules of equity framed to prevent injustice from a 
judgment based on a prior judgment which has been reversed, 
or a judgment no longer equitable in regard to prospective 
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application, or a judgment inequitable for any other reason. 
This Utah Rule is nearly identical to Rule 60 (b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The intended scope of the Rule is 
probably best described by Justice Black of the U.S. Supreme 
Court: 
The Rule empowers courts to set aside judgments 
under five traditional, specified types of 
circumstances in which it would be inequitable 
to permit a judgment to stand. But the draftsmen 
of the Rule did not intend that these specified 
grounds should prevent a granting of similar 
relief in other situations where fairness might 
require it. Accordingly, there was added a broad 
sixth ground: "any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment." Ackerman v. 
U.S., 340 U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.ed. 207(1950) 
Interpretation of the Utah Rule by this court has 
resulted in a holding that a trial court may not act capriciously 
or arbitrarily. Kettner v. Snow, 13 U.2d 382, 375 P.2d 28(1962). 
However, it has also been held that a trial court may exercise 
wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and 
public convenience and will be reversed "...only where an abuse 
of this discretion is clearly shown." Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. 
et al, 123 U.416, 260 P.2d 741(1953). 
The technical arguments of Appellants that Dussaults1 
judgment was neither prior to Bowman's, nor a separate and preceding 
judgment from Bowman's, do not square with the court's own 
statements—nor do they logically follow from Appellants1 
insistance that Donald Bowman's acts were not only "separate and 
distinct" but different from the acts of the Dussaults. The 
trial court found and enumerated the judgments separately and 
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numbered them individually with Dussaults1 listed first, or 
prior, and Bowman's second. That fact alone should be sufficient 
to distinguish the instant case from the Sixth Circuit case, 
Berryhill v. U.S., 199 F.2d 217 (6th Cir.1952), which held that 
a change in judicial view is not a basis for vacating a judgment. 
More important, however, is the fact that Berryhill 
was an attempt to rely on the reversal of another case in 
another jurisdiction involving a similar question. Our case at 
hand, however, involves the same identical case, the same 
jurisdiction and the same facts from which the judgments were 
formed. The finding of the court was that any possible damage 
or loss occasioned by Donald Bowman was "...included in, and not 
separate from, the damage to the trust suffered by reason of 
the co-defendants John Ac Dussault and Dorothy Dussault." (R-8) 
Also, it should be emphatically noted that nobody realized more 
clearly than the trial court that the imposed liability of 
Donald Bowman was completely contingent upon the liability of 
the Dussaults. If the Dussaults had done nothing wrong, then 
Donald Bowman's only sin was acquiescence in nothing wrong. 
Consequently, a fair and proper interpretation of 
subparagraphs (6) and (7) of Rule 60(b) should permit a trial 
court to prevent the kind of injustice inherent in the judgment 
against Donald Bowman. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN VACATING THE 
JUDGMENT AGAINST DONALD W. BOWMAN. 
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Contrary to the opinion of the Appellants/Plaintiffs, 
the trial court was quite precise in stating its reason for 
vacating the judgment against Donald Bowman. In fact, it was 
almost the language of subparagraph (6) of Rule 60(b). The 
court simply stated that Bowman's judgment was "... based on 
the Court findings that Dussault had improperly caused losses." 
(R-19) When the Supreme Court held that Dussaults1 conduct had 
not caused the losses, what else could the trial court do other 
than conclude that acquiescence in non-liable conduct must 
necessarily result in non-liable conduct? To conclude otherwise 
would have been most unjust and probably a clear abuse of 
discretion because the primary and prior judgment against the 
Dussaults had been reversed. 
The facts of this case illustrate convincingly a 
proper application of the power granted by the last clause of 
subparagraph (6) and subparagraph (7) of Rule 60(b) which 
authorize a court to vacate a judgment when "...it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or, (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment." The anomaly of a possible non-application of 
Rule 60(b) in the instant case is that Donald Bowman would be 
unjustly punished. This is especially true in light of the 
previous finding of the trial court that 
Donald Bowman has always acted in good faith 
and is entitled to indemnification against 
wrong-doing Trustees. (R-3) 
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Appellantsf argument that the motion to vacate the 
Bowman judgment was not filed within a reasonable time has its 
basis in the inconsistent argument that the Dussault judgment 
was not separate from nor prior to, and yet was "separate and 
distinct". If it were separate and distinct, it had to precede 
the Bowman judgment—at least that is what the trial court said 
and so held. 
Such being the case, a reasonable time for filing a 
motion for relief must toll from the day the prior judgment is 
reversed—not the day of entry of the dependent or second 
judgment, Jackson v, Jackson, 276 F.2d 501 (D .C.Cir.1960) . 
This test was clearly met in the instant case. Within one week 
of the receipt of the Supreme Court decision reversing the 
Dussault judgment, the Bowman motion for relief was filed. 
The Annat and Ackerman cases cited by Appellants 
represent a federal court stricture of the federal equivalent 
of Rule 60(b) that could squeeze all life from said rule* Most 
reasonable men would wince at the inhumane conclusion in Annat 
that 
The fact that the judgment was erroneous does 
not constitute "any other reason justifying 
relief." 
In that case a widow was barred from relief because 
she failed to appeal a judgment based on an erroneous legal 
description. Annat v. Beard, 277 F.2d 554(5th Cir. 1960). 
Ackerman involved the failure of a German national during 
World War II to appeal from a denaturalization proceeding. 
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It was a five justice decision of the U. S. Supreme Court that 
was caustically criticized by Justice Black in his dissent: 
It does no good to have liberalizing rules like 60(b) 
if, after they are written, their arteries are 
hardened by this Court's resort to ancient 
commonlaw concepts. Ackerman v. U.S., 340 U.S. 
193, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.ed. 207(1950). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this court should 
affirm the trial court's order vacating the judgment against 
Respondent Donald W. Bowman. 
Respectfully, 
William J. Critchlow, III 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
P. 0. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Attorney for Respondent 
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